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Abstract
An assessment of the perceptions of respondents on the safety culture at an accredited Part 141 four year collegiate aviation program
was conducted as part of the implementation of a safety management system (SMS). The Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture
Assessment Survey (CAPSCAS), which was modified and revalidated from the existing Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS),
was used. Participants were drawn from flight students and certified flight instructors in the program. The survey captured the perceptions
of participants on the status of the safety culture in the program. There were significant variances in the perception of respondents on the
safety culture by year groups, and it was observed that respondents who had spent more years in the program had a better perception on
the prevailing safety culture than those who had just entered the program. There were also significant differences in the perceptions of
U.S. resident students and international contract students on the program’s safety culture. The international students had a less favorable
perception of the safety culture in the program. The results show that differences in national culture can have a significant effect on
perceptions of the safety culture in a collegiate aviation program.
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Introduction
Modern aviation operations are growing ever more
complex in times of increased demand for services with
decreased resources (Wensveen, 2010). Organizational
factors like safety culture and regulatory oversight play
significant roles in the foundation of safety in high-risk
systems (von Thaden, 2008). Several high profile acci-
dents in the late twentieth century brought considerable
attention to the role of organizational safety culture
and regulatory oversight in accident causation (von
Thaden, 2006; Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma,
& Gibbons, 2004). Accordingly, the Federal Aviation
Administration has established a comprehensive and
integrated procedure to encompass a national standard of
system safety with the introduction of Safety Management
Systems in aviation operations (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2008).
Safety Management Systems provide a top-down,
businesslike approach to safety and emphasize proactive
and data-driven management of safety, distinct from the
traditional reactionary approach (Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, 2008). The Federal Aviation Administration issued
AC 120-92A to introduce the concept of Safety Manage-
ment Systems to aviation service providers like collegiate
aviation organizations (Part 141) under FAA SMS
Guidance, Order 8000.369 and Aviation Safety (AVS)
Requirements Document, Order VS 8000.367. The Airline
Safety and Federal Aviation Extension Act of 2010 (Public
Law 111-216) directed the FAA to issue a final rule on SMS
by July 30, 2012. The FAA is systematically working on
establishing requirements for U.S. aviation certificate
holders to implement SMS.
The implementation of SMS and the sustenance of a
positive safety culture in a collegiate aviation program can
generate both economic and operational benefits. Moncton
Flight College (MFC) in New Brunswick implemented
SMS and managed to have a $25,000 annual savings in
insurance premiums along with a significant reduction in
regulatory audit findings (Lercel, Steckel, Mondello, Carr,
& Patankar, 2011).
Continued research into proactive organizational safety
culture provides a better understanding of organizational
performance, accountabilities, policies, and procedures
surrounding safety (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008). The
aim of this new oversight relationship between aviation
organizations and regulatory authorities is to shift away
from a prescriptive era to one of proactive and systematic
business-oriented safety management (Stolzer, Haldford, &
Goglia, 2011).
Purpose of the Study
The successful implementation of an SMS initiative in a
collegiate aviation program is strongly influenced by the
safety culture status of front-line personnel like certified
flight instructors (CFIs) and flight students. The norms,
perceptions, values, and attitudes toward safety of these
groups of people will have an impact on the safety culture
of the aviation organization (Cooper, 2000). An important
component for the successful implementation of an SMS
program in any aviation organization is the level of
the positive status of the organizational safety culture
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009).
The purpose of this study was to assess the perceptions
of flight students and flight instructors on the status of the
prevailing safety culture after the implementation of a
phased process of Safety Management Systems in a
collegiate flight program.
Research Questions
1. What are the differences in perception among
respondents (commercial flight students and certified flight
instructors) on the status of the safety culture at an
accredited four year collegiate aviation program?
2. What are the differences between the perception of
international contract students and indigenous U.S. students
on the status of the safety culture at an accredited four year
collegiate aviation program?
Literature Review
Positive organizational safety culture creates empower-
ment which gives responsibility and authority to all and
provides a horizontal safety hierarchy so as to treat every
input equal to others (Bos & Lu, 2007). Wood (2003)
commented that the feeling of involvement would motivate
users of the SMS to contribute insights to safety per-
formance. Effective safety management in the twenty-first
century involves paying attention to human factors
(Perezgonzalez, 2009). System components have as much
potential to cause, or save, dangerous system states as
technical components (Yule, 2003).
Lu, Przetak, & Wetmore (2005) state that by paying
attention to human factors, aviation organizations can
identify and capture potential hazards before they manifest
as accidents. One method of achieving this is by measuring
the state of safety through so-called ‘‘leading’’ indicators
such as safety culture or safety climate (Yule, 2003). These
are seen as distinct from ‘‘lagging’’ indicators of safety,
such as accidents, as they offer insight into the state of
safety without the need for retrospective analyses of
negative safety outcomes (von Thaden et al., 2006).
Defining and Building Up a Safety Culture
For the purposes of this study, safety culture was defined
as ‘‘the set of enduring values and attitudes regarding safety
issues, shared by every member of every level of an
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organization’’ (Piers, Montijn, & Balk, 2009, p. 5). Safety
culture also ‘‘refers to the personal dedication and
accountability of individuals engaged in any activity that
has a bearing on the safe provision of aviation service’’
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2007, appendix A-3).
Without a doubt, the core accomplishment of SMS is to
create a positive safety culture to maintain and further
improve the entire system’s safety (IATA, 2011).
Summary of Safety Culture Studies in Commercial
Aviation Operations
Wiegmann et al. (2004, p. 129) reported that ‘‘few
formally documented efforts have been made to assess
safety culture within the aviation industry, with the notable
exception of military aviation.’’ Three studies reported a
safety assessment using commercial aviation pilots. The
Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (2004) and Evans,
Glendon, & Creed (2007) reported on the development of a
safety culture questionnaire designed to gain insight into
pilots’ perceptions of workplace safety (n5 1,308). The
questionnaire consisted of six safety factors, each with five
items. These factors were based upon previous safety
culture research and input from aviation safety experts.
Data from half of the sample were used in an exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) that resulted in a three factor model
of management commitment and communication, safety
training and equipment, and maintenance. A confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) on the remaining half of the sample
showed the three factor model to be an adequate fit to the
data.
Finally, the responses from different types of pilots
(regular public transport, charter, or aerial work such as
emergency medical services or agriculture) were compared
on each of the four identified safety culture factors. No
significant differences between the groups were found. The
Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (2004) concluded
that this was due to a single professional safety climate for
pilots as a group, regardless of the organization for whom
they worked.
Gibbons, von Thaden, & Wiegmann (2006) developed a
questionnaire designed to assess safety culture within the
context of airline flight operations. Gibbons et al.’s survey
consisted of 84 items, grouped into five themes. The survey
was designed by examining the content of safety culture
questionnaires that have been used in other High Risk
Organizations (HRO). A total of 503 responses were
received from a single company. After discarding 29 items
and using CFA, the analysis eventually resulted in a
structure of four broad factors (organizational commitment,
operations personnel, informal safety system, and formal
safety system), with three subfactors in each.
Block, Sabin, & Patankar (2007) reanalyzed the
responses obtained from the 281 pilots from the previous
study by Patankar (2003). The purpose was to examine
whether the data supported what Block described as the
purpose-alignment-control (PAC) model. A pair of experts
recoded the Patankar (2003) survey items in accordance
with the PAC model. The proposed factors were tested
using a structural equation modeling methodology. The
main drivers of safety outcomes were organizational
affiliation (similar to ‘‘pride in company’’ [Patankar,
2003]) and proactive management (partially derived
from the ‘‘safety opinion’’ factor [Patankar, 2003]). Organi-
zational affiliation was directly influenced by communica-
tion, and proactive management was influenced by training
effectiveness and relational supervision.
Substantial research and studies in safety culture
assessments have been done in the airline and maintenance
organizations (Patankar, 2003; von Thaden, Kessel &
Ruengvisesh, 2008) environment as well as in the air traffic
control organization (Gordon & Kirwan, 2004), but not
much has been done in assessing the safety culture in flight
training organizations, especially among flight students and
flight instructors. This study intends to build up the strong
foundations built by parallel studies in other aviation
organizations to assess the safety culture among this
particular subset of aviation operations.
SMS and Safety Culture in Collegiate Aviation in the
United States
Even though, presently, SMS and safety culture assess-
ment are not regulatory requirements in the United States
for aviation training organizations like collegiate and
university aviation programs (FAA, 2010c), a number of
SMS pilot programs are being run by some proactive
university aviation departments due to the immense
positive benefits that they stand to derive (Ullrich, 2012).
SMS and a positive safety culture would be substantially
advantageous to collegiate aviation because they perform
standardized activities towards established goals (FAA,
2013).
Collegiate aviation has areas of particular risk because
students may have little or no prior flight experience and
because malfunctions and unusual situations have to be
simulated in order to expose these students to the variety of
elements as part of their routine flying activity (FAA,
2012). In other words, in flight training, pilots may perform
maneuvers that should not be accomplished as part of
normal flight with the added risk that this entails. Collegiate
aviation has had its fair share of tragic accidents and
incidents (NTSB, 2007).
There is an imperative need for controlling risk through
an assessment of the prevalent safety culture inherent in the
program (Patankar, 2003). There is no type-specific
framework for the assessment of safety culture in collegiate
aviation, and some of the few studies done have used
modified survey tools more suited for airlines and airports
(University of North Dakota Safety Council, 2011). The
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safety culture assessment will provide the needed data and
feedback to make changes that will continuously improve
safety and ensure an integrated system-wide safety net for
training organizations (McCune, 2012).
Components of a Positive Safety Culture
A positive safety culture is the engine that drives the
organization towards the goal of maximum attainable
operational safety regardless of any formats of resistance,
obstacles, and pressures (International Civil Aviation
Organization, 2009). A positive safety culture promotes
mutual respect among the employees and managers of the
organization (Simon & Cistaro, 2009). A positive safety
culture ensures that operational hazards and errors are
anticipated (Stolzer et al., 2011). There are five components
of a positive safety culture, namely: informed, reporting,
just, learning, and flexible cultures, as outlined in Figure 1.
Methodology
The study used the Collegiate Aviation Program Safety
Culture Assessment Survey (CAPSCAS), which is a
modified form of the Commercial Aviation Safety Survey
(CASS), which is a validated tool developed by von
Thaden and Gibbons (2008). The CASS identifies the
respondents’ perception of the current state as well as the
strengths and weaknesses of the safety culture in an
organization. The CASS was specifically modified and
revalidated for collegiate aviation programs (Creswell,
2009). The adaptation and modification were done with
permission from Dr. Terry von Thaden, copyright owner
for CASS.
CAPSCAS was then used to assess the safety culture
perception of commercial flight students and certified flight
instructors. The CAPSCAS provided a baseline measure of
the collegiate program’s safety culture, thus obtaining a
benchmark to judge critical movement and change in the
aviation program’s safety culture.
Population
The population (n 5 1,500) for the study consisted of
aviation students and certified flight instructors at the
aviation department of an accredited CFR Part 141 flight
training and four-year degree-awarding university in the
Northwestern region of the United States. The sample (n 5
945) was drawn from undergraduate commercial flight
students, international contract flight students, and certified
flight instructors at the university. Air Traffic Control
(ATC), Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), Flight Technol-
ogy (FT), and graduate students (GS) were not included in
this study.
Survey Administration
Participants responded to items in the survey instrument
using a 5-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly
agree) and a nonapplicable option (Creswell, 2009). The
survey was administered through an online survey tool
called QualtricsH online in the English language to allow
for simplicity of delivery and anonymity of participants.
Participants were assured of the confidentiality of their
responses.
The survey allowed participants to have plenty of
opportunities to provide more information if they wished
to do so, and some open-ended questions were asked to
specifically explore the nature of these activities. There
were 61 items in the survey broken into the following
sections: formal safety, informal safety, operational inter-
actions, organizational commitment, safety behavior, and
demographics.
Figure 1. The components of safety culture: Definitions of informed, flexible, reporting, just and learning cultures. (Used with permission from Global
Aviation Information Network, 2004.)
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Results and Data Analysis
Quantitative data was imported into the SPSSH software
and analyzed. All additional comments and responses were
coded manually by the researcher for themes and analyzed
using SPSSH. Significant values were set at the 0.05 alpha
levels (two-tailed). The survey was tested for content
validity and reliability of scale.
Content Validity
A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was conducted
on the 61 items with orthogonal rotation (varimax). The
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified the sampling
adequacy for the analysis (KMO 5 0.84 and all KMO
values for individual items . 0.85) which is well above the
acceptable limit of 0.5 (Field, 2009). A Bartlett’s test of
sphericity x2(1891) 5 6304, p , 0.001, was conducted and
indicated that the correlation between items were suffi-
ciently large for PCA. Thirteen components were extracted
and had Eigen values greater than Kaiser’s criterion of 1
and, in combination, explained 73.90% of the variance.
Reliability
All four major scales of the CAPSCAS (Formal Safety,
Informal Safety, Operations Interaction, and Organizational
Commitment) showed high reliabilities. Test reliability
refers to the consistency or reliability of questionnaire items
(Stevens, 2002). A reliable scale is one that will yield the
same score for two different individuals with the same true
level of the trait or attitude being measured, or for one
individual tested twice, assuming that no changes have
occurred between tests (Cronbach,1951; Cortina, 1993).
Within a scale, items that assess the same underlying
dimension are related or correlated with one another (Field,
2009; Creswell, 2009). The values for reliability are
outlined in Table 2 and show the Cronbach’s alpha values
for all major scales.
Demographic Information
At the end of the response period, (n 5 234) responses
were obtained from the survey and comprised of fully (n 5
142) completed and useable responses representing a 61%
return rate. About 51.7% of the respondents provided
comments in the text boxes provided for extra comments.
Of the total respondents, 34% identified themselves as
freshmen, 5% were sophomores, 17% were juniors, 22%
were seniors, and CFI/others accounted for the remaining
21%. This number represents respondents who answered
the demographic question about their status in terms of
years spent in the flight program as students and CFI at the
university. Table 3 outlines the categories.
The respondents were asked about their status as either
resident U.S. students or international contract students in
the university’s flight program. This was done to determine
how many international contract students responded to the
survey. The flight program at the university has a number
of international contract students from predominantly Asia
and the Middle East and whose national culture and
perception about the safety culture of the flight program of
the university may not be the same as resident U.S.
students. One of the aims of the study was to find out if
there was any difference in the perception on the status of
the safety culture of the flight program by the two groups.
Table 5 illustrates this category.
Analysis of Research Questions
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to find if
there were any significant differences in the mean
responses of the participants on the safety culture of the
flight program. A one-way independent ANOVA and post
hoc (Games-Howell) analysis was used to find out which
Table 1
Scales inventory for the CAPSCAS.
CAPSCASMajor Factor Scales Sub-factor Scales
Formal Safety Program Reporting System
Response and feedback
Safety Personnel
Informal Safety Program Accountability
Pilot Authority
Professionalism
Operations Interaction Supervisors of Flight (SoF)/Lead Flight/
Chief Flight Instructor
Dispatch/Ground and Ramp Personnel





Cronbach’s alpha for CAPSCAS.
Major Scale
Number of Items in
Scale (n) Cronbach’s a
Formal Safety Program 15 0.90
Informal Safety Program 14 0.85
Operations Interaction 19 0.87
Organizational Commitment 14 0.86
Total for CAPSCAS 62 0.96
Table 3
Category of respondents.
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groups differ in their mean responses since no specific
hypothesis was generated before the research (Field, 2009).
There was a significant difference in the mean responses of
perception on the item ‘‘I feel like I am gambling with the
safety of my aircraft every time I go on a training activity.’’
F(4,128) 5 2.83, p , 0.05 (two-tailed) which falls under
the subscale of Ramp Operations and major scale of
Operations Interaction. A post hoc analysis (Games-
Howell) revealed that there were significant differences
between the mean responses of juniors and freshmen, p ,
0.05 (two-tail).
The item ‘‘My university is committed to equipping
aircraft with up to date technology’’ under the subscale
of Safety Fundamentals and scale of Organizational
Commitment showed significant differences in the mean
responses of respondents, F(4,126) 5 3.02, p , 0.05. A
post hoc analysis revealed significant differences in the
mean responses between the juniors and freshmen, p ,
0.05. The other item that showed significant differences in
mean responses was ‘‘Management tries to get around
safety requirements whenever they get the chance.’’ The
results were F(4,125) 53.22, p , 0.05. Further post hoc
analysis revealed that there were significant differences in
the mean responses of juniors and freshmen, p , 0.05.
Figure 2 displays a simple bar graph with error bars
highlighting the significant differences in mean of
responses to their perception of the safety culture.
For the second research question, an independent t-test
was used to determine if there existed any significant
differences in the mean perception of the resident U.S.
students (n 5 95) and international flight students (n 5 39)
on the safety culture of the university’s flight program The
variances in the samples were assumed roughly equal, and
scores were independent. The mean perception on the
status of the safety reporting system of the collegiate
aviation program of resident U.S. students (M 5 4.27, SE
5 0.23) was better than the international contract students
(M 5 3.77, SE 5 0.23), when asked, ‘‘The safety reporting
system is convenient and easy to use.’’ The responses were
all above the neutral point of 3. The differences in the mean
response were also significant, t(132) 5 22.59, p , 0.05.
The resident U.S. students had a mean response of (M5
3.40, SE5 0.18) as compared to the international students
who had a mean response of (M5 2.49, SE5 0.27) when
asked for their perception on the statement ‘‘Pilots do not
bother reporting near misses or close calls, since this event
does not cause any real damage.’’ The difference was
significant, t(132) 5 2.68, p , 0.05. This shows that the
contract students in their perception agreed with the item.
The responses for the item ‘‘Pilots are satisfied with the
way the university deals with safety reports’ showed that
the contract students (M 5 3.92, SE 5 0.23) had a more
positive perception than the U.S. students (M5 3.37, SE5
0.11), even though all of the mean responses were above
the neutral point of 3.
The differences in their responses were significant,
t(132) 5 2.35, p , 0.05. However, when the mean
responses of their perception on the item ‘‘University only
keeps track of major safety problems and overlooks routine
ones’’ were compared, the resident U.S. students (M 5
3.92, SE 5 0.16) disagreed with the item, whereas the
international students (M 5 2.44, SE 5 0.27) who agreed
with the item. The differences in their responses was
significant, t(132) 5 24.78, p , 0.05.
Generally, there was a good perception on the item
‘‘Personnel responsible for safety hold high status in the
university.’’ The mean responses for the U.S. students
(M 5 4.13, SE 5 0.07) was higher than the international
students (M 5 3.72, SE 5 0.21). The difference in
response was significant, t(130) 5 22.03, p , 0.05. Both
groups were in strong agreement with the item ‘‘Personnel
responsible for safety have power to make changes.’’ The
mean of responses for the U.S. students (M 5 4.34, SE 5
0.07) was higher than the international students (M 5 3.71,
SE 5 0.21). The difference in responses was significant,
t(130) 5 23.45, p , 0.05.
The two groups also agreed with the item ‘‘Personnel
responsible for safety have a clear understanding of the risk
involved in flight.’’ The mean responses of the U.S,
students (M 5 4.31, SE 5 0.09) was higher than the
international students (M 5 3.87, SE 5 0.21), and the
Table 4
Gender distribution of respondents.












Airman certifications and ratings.
Airman Certificates/Ratings Number (n) Percentage (%)
Student 18 13
Private 52 39
Commercial Single-Engine 7 5
Commercial Multiengine 20 15
CFI 4 3
CFI (Instrument) 15 11
Multiengine Instructor (MEI) 8 6
Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 3 7
Others/Mixed Certificate 7 5
Total 134 100
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differences in the mean responses were significant, t(130)
5 22.11, p , 0.05. The item ‘‘Safety personnel have little
or no authority compared to operational personnel’’ showed
that, while the U.S. students (M 5 4.29, SE 5 0.14)
disagreed with the item, the international students (M 5
2.03, SE 5 0.27) agreed with it. There was a significant
difference in the mean of their responses, t(128) 5 26.63,
p , .05.
The item ‘‘University management shows favoritism to
certain pilots’’ showed that the perception of the U.S.
students (M 5 3.15, SE 5 0.18) were partially neutral,
while the international students (M 5 2.03, SE 5 0.27)
agreed with the item. The differences in responses were
significant, t(128) 5 23.28, p , 0.05. The international
students (M 5 2.35, SE 5 0.28) had a strong perception
that ‘‘When accidents and incidents happen, management
always blame the pilot’’ as compared to the U.S. students
(M 5 3.39, SE 5 0.17) who partially disagreed with the
item. The differences in their responses were significant,
t(128) 5 23.12, p , 0.05.
The two groups had a neutral perception that ‘‘Pilots are
actively involved in identifying and resolving safety
concerns.’’ The responses of the U.S. students (M 5
3.23, SE5 0.11) had a lower mean as compared to the
international students (M 5 3.82, SE 5 0.19). The
differences in the mean responses for both groups were
significant, t(130) 5 2.67, p , 0.05. The international
students (M 5 2.26, SE 5 0.28) had a strong perception
that ‘‘Pilots who call in sick or fatigued are scrutinized by
the Supervisor of Flight or other flight management
personnel,’’ while the U.S. students (M 5 3.69, SE 5
0.18) disagreed with the item. The differences in their
responses were significant, t(130) 5 24.25, p , 0.05. The
international students (M 5 2.53, SE 5 0.29) also had a
strong perception that ‘‘Pilots have little or no authority to
make decisions that affect the safety of normal flight
operations.’’ The U.S. students (M 5 3.45, SE 5 0.13),
however, disagreed with the item. The differences in their
responses were significant t(130) 5 23.86, p , 0.05.
The U.S. students (M5 2.88, SE5 0.12) disagreed with
the item ‘‘Pilots who are new and less senior are willing
to speak up regarding flight safety issues,’’ while the
international students (M5 3.55, SE5 0.21) agreed. There
was a significant difference in their responses t(130) 5
2.80, p , 0.05. The U.S. students (M 5 2.47, SE 5 0.09),
however, disagreed that ‘‘Pilots never cut corners or
compromise safety, regardless of the operational pressures
to do so’’ while the international students (M 5 3.55, SE5
0.21) agreed. There were significant differences in their
responses, t(130) 5 4.79, p , 0.05.
The international students (M 5 2.59, SE5 0.33) agreed
with the item ‘‘Chief/Lead CFIs and Supervisors of Flight
are unavailable when pilots need help,’’ while the U.S.
students (M 5 4.19, SE 5 0.16) disagreed. The differences
between their response were significant, t(127) 5 24.19, p
, 0.05. The international students (M 5 2.88, SE 5 0.32)
had a perception that ‘‘As long as there are no accidents or
incidents, Chief/Lead CFIs and Supervisors of Flight don’t
care how flight operations are performed,’’ while the U.S.
students (M 5 4.91,SE 5 0.16) disagreed. The differences
in their responses were significant, t(127) 5 23.92, p ,
0.05.
The international students (M5 2.79, SE5 0.34) agreed
with the item ‘‘Dispatch inappropriately uses MEL, when it
is better to fix equipment.’’ The U.S. students (M 5 4.48,
SE 5 0.12) strongly disagreed. The differences in
responses were significant, t(126) 5 25.80, p , 0.05.
The U.S. students (M 5 4.27, SE 5 0.14) disagreed with
Figure 2. Simple bar graph of ‘‘mean perception of safety culture.’’
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the item ‘‘Dispatch would rather take a chance with safety
than cancel a flight.’’ The international students (M 5 2.06,
SE 5 0.29) strongly agreed. The differences in their
responses were significant, t(127) 5 27.35, p , 0.05.
Both U.S, students (M 5 4.28, SE 5 0.05) and
international students (M 5 3.91, SE 5 0.18) agreed with
the item ‘‘Instructors/trainers have a clear understanding of
the risk associated with operations.’’ The differences in
their responses were significant, t(126) 5 22.49, p , 0.05.
Both U.S. students (M 5 4.31, SE 5 0.13) and
international students (M 5 3.91, SE 5 0.18) all agreed
on the item ‘‘Safety is consistently emphasized during
training at my university.’’ There was a significant
difference in their responses, t(126) 5 22.33, p , 0.05.
The international students (M 5 2.21, SE 5 0.31) had a
perception that ‘‘Instructors/trainers teach shortcuts and
ways to get around safety requirements’’ while the U.S.
students (M 5 4.24, SE 5 0.13) disagreed. The differences
in their responses were significant, t(126) 5 26.89, p ,
0.05.
U.S. students (M 5 4.17, SE 5 0.07) and the
international students (M 5 3.76, SE 5 0.18) agreed on
the item ‘‘Ramp personnel are careful about position of
equipment (fuel trucks, power carts, etc.).’’ There was
significance in the differences in their responses, t(131) 5
22.41, p , 0.05. The international students (M 5 2.63, SE
5 0.31) had a perception that ‘‘Ramp personnel are careless
about removing debris (e.g. cups, rags, tools, clothing, etc.)
near the aircraft, which may pose FOD hazards.’’ The U.S.
students (M 5 4.28, SE 5 0.14) did not agree with this
item. The differences in their responses were significant,
t(130) 5 25.49, p , 0.05. International students (M 5
2.47, SE 5 0.31) agreed with the item ‘‘I feel like I am
gambling with the safety of my aircraft every time I go on a
training activity’’ while the U.S. students (M 5 4.65, SE 5
0.10) disagreed. The differences in their response were
significant, t(131) 5 28.54, p , 0.05.
U.S. students (M 5 3.76, SE 5 0.16) disagreed with the
item ‘‘Management is more concerned with making money
than being safe’’ while the international students (M 5
2.58, SE 5 0.31) agreed. The differences in their responses
was significant, t(128) 5 23.57, p , 0.05. International
students (M 5 2.84, SE 5 0.31) agreed with the item
‘‘Management does not show much concern for safety until
there is an accident or incident,’’ while the U.S. students (M
5 4.14, SE 5 0.15) disagreed. Both U.S. students (M 5
4.34, SE 5 0.06) and international students (M 5 3.97, SE
5 0.18) agreed with the item ‘‘My university flight manual
is carefully kept up to date.’’ The differences in their
responses were significant, t(129) 5 22.18, p , 0.05.
U.S. students (M5 4.16, SE 5 0.08) and international
students (M 5 3.79, SE 5 0.18) both agreed with the item
‘‘My university is willing to invest money, resources, and
effort to improve safety.’’ The differences between the
responses were significant, t(129) 5 22.18, p , 0.05. The
international students (M 5 3.87, SE 5 0.18) and U.S.
students (M 5 4.55, SE 5 0.05) both agreed with the item
‘‘My university is committed to equip aircraft with up-to-
date technology.’’ The differences in responses were
significant, t(129) 5 24.62, p , 0.05. The item ‘‘My
university ensures that maintenance on aircraft is ade-
quately performed and aircraft safe to operate’’ was agreed
on by the U.S. students (M 5 4.58, SE 5 0.06) and
international students (M 5 3.92, SE 5 0.19). The
differences in their responses were significant, t(129) 5
24.07, p , 0.05.
The U.S. students (M 5 4.11, SE 5 0.09) and
international students (M 5 3.55, SE 5 0.20) agreed with
the item ‘‘Management goes above and beyond regulatory
minimums, when it comes to issues of flight safety.’’ The
differences in their mean responses were significant, t(128)
5 22.79, p , 0.05. The international students (M 5 2.21,
SE 5 0.28) agreed that ‘‘Management schedules CFIs as
much as legally possible, with little concern for their sleep
schedule or fatigue.’’ The U.S. students (M 5 3.67, SE 5
0.17), however, disagreed. The differences in the responses
were significant, t(128) 5 24.48, p , 0.05.
The U.S. students (M 5 4.61, SE 5 0.11) disagreed that
‘‘Management tries to get around safety requirements
whenever they get the chance.’’ The international students
(M 5 2.32, SE 5 0.28) agreed with the item and the
differences in the responses of the two groups were
significant, t(128) 5 29.10, p , 0.05. Finally, both U.S.
students (M 5 4.09, SE 5 0.10) and international students
(M 5 3.68, SE 5 0.20) agreed that ‘‘Management views
violations very seriously even when they don’t result in any
serious damage or injury.’’ The differences in their
responses were significant, t(128) 5 22.00, p , 0.05.
Discussion
Perception of Safety Culture Among Respondents
The first part of the discussion sought to deal with the
research question, ‘‘What are the differences in perception
among respondents [commercial flight students and
certified flight instructors] on the status of the safety
culture at an accredited four year collegiate aviation
program?’’ The research question was to find out the level
of variability in the perception of flight students and flight
instructors on the safety culture in the university’s flight
program.
A good measure of consistency in the safety culture of an
organization is to focus on the variance in survey responses
(von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008). When a population
demonstrates considerable variance, the coherent structure
for an underlying culture of safety is, for all intents and
purposes, nonexistent and shows that there are gaps in the
purpose, alignment, and control of the safety management
(Patankar, 2003).
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The results showed that respondents had a good
perception and favorable outlook of the safety culture
prevailing in the university’s flight program. There were,
however, some areas that needed improvement, and the
discussion will focus more on the areas for improvement
for the safety program and how the Safety Management
Systems can consolidate a more proactive and positive
safety culture.
There was a significant difference in the mean responses
of perception on the item ‘‘I feel like I am gambling with
the safety of my aircraft every time I go on a training
activity,’’ under the major scale of Operations Interaction.
The significant differences were between the responses of
juniors and freshmen. The results showed that, while the
juniors had a more favorable perception on most items
under operations interaction, the freshmen had poor
perception on these items. Since the university has a
standard operational procedure and curricula for all flight
operations, it was expected that there would be very
minimal variability of responses among the year groups.
However, variability in perception can be a function of
training environment, operational interaction, experience
level, prior training, fleet assignment, and operational
safety records (von Thaden et al., 2008).
A significant variation in responses can also be a result
of the risk perception among the year groups (Block et al.,
2007). A more risk-loving attitude and behavior can result
in significant safety breaches in the wall of the most
formidable safety management system (Reason & Hobbs,
2003; Patankar, 2003). Concurrence is a critical feature of a
healthy safety culture (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008;
IATA, 2011), as it reflects the degree to which both juniors
and freshmen share a common perception of the safety
culture. It is, therefore, important for more attention to be
focused on freshmen by reinforcing safety education,
especially on operations interaction.
The item ‘‘My University is committed to equipping
aircraft with up-to-date technology’’ under the subscale
of Safety Fundamentals and scale of Organizational
Commitment showed a significant difference in the mean
responses of juniors and freshmen. There were some
relevant comments from respondents:
‘‘As per technology in the aircraft, just look at our fleet.
Most of the fixed-wing are astounding. Most of the
helicopters are laughable. I feel that there is not equal
representation among fixed-wing and rotorcraft in terms
of technology. This obviously plays a role in safety.’’
The quote underscores the perception that updating
aircraft with new technology is skewed towards fixed-wing
operation and that management should make a conscious
effort to create equity in allocation of resources. It can
create a perception that management is not committed to
enhancing safety in some fleet of the program.
The other item that showed significant differences in
mean responses was ‘‘Management tries to get around
safety requirements whenever they get the chance.’’ There
were significant differences in responses between the
juniors and the freshmen. From the results, the freshmen
seem to have a rather poor perception about the commit-
ment of management to safety, while the juniors had a
rather good perception. The diametrical responses and
measure of the perception of the commitment of manage-
ment to safety potentially indicates a gap in the safety
management of the flight program.
Perception of International Students and U.S. Students on
the Safety Culture in the Collegiate Aviation Program
This section of the discussion focuses on the second
research question: ‘‘What are the differences between the
perception of international contract students and resident
U.S. students on the status of the safety culture at an
accredited four year collegiate aviation program?’’
The perceptions of these two groups (international
students and resident U.S. students) were analyzed on the
basis of the impact of national culture on their perception
on the safety culture (Hofstede & Holfstede, 2004). Fanjoy
& Gao (2011), in their study on the learning style of
Chinese collegiate aviation students, observes that Chinese
culture is significantly different from that of the U.S. in
terms of power-distance, individualism, and long-term
orientation. Joy & Kolb (2009) states that national culture
has an impact on individual learning and cognitive style
preferences. Hofstede & Hofstede (2004) suggests that
when students from a different cultural background are
educated in a different cultural context, the impact of the
cultural differences should be considered to identify any
potential negative influence.
The item ‘‘Pilots do not bother reporting near misses or
close calls, since this event does not cause any real
damage’’ on the reporting system of the flight program
showed that resident U.S. students disagreed with the item
while the contract students, in their perception, agreed with
the item. The significant differences in the responses could
be a result of the level of risk perception among the two
groups, as compared to a similar study on general aviation
pilots by Hunter (2006). The differences in national culture
and language could also affect the perception and behavior
of these two groups as outlined in the research of Kanki,
Helmreich & Anca (2010) on crew management resources
among multicultural crews.
When the mean responses of their perception on the item
‘‘University only keeps track of major safety problems and
overlooks routine ones’’ were compared, the resident U.S.
students disagreed with the item while the international
students agreed with the item. The differences in their
responses were significant. The results show similarities
with the study of Dillman, Voges & Robertson (2011),
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which showed that flight students sometimes simply do not
report safety occurrences because, in their opinion, the
event is not significant enough to warrant completing the
paperwork, since it takes time, energy and effort. There is
also the issue of effective feedback from management for
the effort of reporting safety occurrences. If students do not
receive tangible and timely feedback from safety manage-
ment personnel on seemingly insignificant reported safety
hazards and occurrences, it promotes apathy and stifles an
effective safety reporting system.
The U.S. students disagreed with the item ‘‘Safety
personnel have little or no authority compared to opera-
tional personnel,’’ but the international students strongly
agreed with it. There was a significant difference in the
mean of their responses. This can be an indication of
the perceived marginal input of safety personnel in the
administration and operation of contract flight programs.
The international students’ perception is probably influ-
enced by their increased interaction with the operational
personnel over the safety personnel.
The item ‘‘University management shows favoritism to
certain pilots’’ showed that the perceptions of the U.S.
students were almost neutral while the international
students agreed with the item. The differences in responses
were significant, and this was correlated to the response to
the item ‘‘When accidents and incidents happen, manage-
ment always blame the pilot,’’ where the international
students strongly agreed but the U.S. students partially
disagreed. This result is similar to the research findings of
von Thaden et al. (2008), which suggested that a primary
challenge regarding accountability concerns perceptions of
favoritism. It appears that pilots are not blamed unfairly for
their errors, but favored pilots may receive more beneficial
outcomes than non-favored pilots (Dekker, 2007).
The international students had a strong perception that
‘‘Pilots who call in sick or fatigued are scrutinized by the
Supervisors of Flight (SoF) or other flight management
personnel,’’ while the U.S. students disagreed with the
item. The international students also had a strong percep-
tion that ‘‘Pilots have little or no authority to make
decisions that affect the safety of normal flight operations.’’
The U.S. students, however, disagreed. The two items,
rather, send a worrying signal about the perception of the
international students on their input when it comes to
making decisions that can affect the safety of flight. Studies
by Gordon & Kirwan (2004) and Dillman et al. (2011)
highlight the importance of personnel input in order to
achieve an effective SMS.
The U.S. students disagreed with the item ‘‘Pilots who
are new and less senior are willing to speak up regarding
flight safety issues,’’ while the international students
agreed. This was quite unusual since Hofstede (1980),
and Hofstede & Hofstede (2004) suggest that national
cultures with Low Power Distance, like those of U. S.
students, have a tendency to be more assertive and bold
when in a group, compared to the international students
who mostly have a culture that is more of a High Power
Distance which makes them less willing to challenge
authority. The U.S. students, however, disagreed that,
‘‘Pilots never cut corners or compromise safety, regardless
of the operational pressures to do so,’’ while the
international students agreed. National cultural values like
Uncertainty Avoidance (rules and order [Hofstede, 1980;
Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005]) could largely influence this
perception. Respondents provided comments to reinforce
their perceptions and are quoted below:
‘‘I think in general most pilots treat safety with respect
and are professional about safety, but there are some
who are much more willing to cut corners or ignore
safety policies and procedures than others.’’
‘‘Students are negatively impacted by not meeting flight
templates which promotes them to cut corners and fly
when they should not.’’
The international students agreed with the item
‘‘Dispatch inappropriately uses MEL when it is better to
fix equipment.’’ The U.S. students strongly disagreed. The
U.S. students disagreed with the item ‘‘Dispatch would
rather take a chance with safety than cancel a flight.’’ The
international students strongly agreed. This was another
worrying trend in flight operations interaction of the
university. It could be a result of the operational tempo
of contract training, which sometimes requires that
international student to fly under some pressure to meet
company deadlines.
U.S. students disagreed with the item ‘‘Management is
more concerned with making money than being safe,’’
while the international students agreed. The international
students agreed with the item ‘‘Management does not show
much concern for safety until there is an accident or
incident,’’ while the U.S. students disagreed. The interna-
tional students agreed that ‘‘Management schedules CFIs as
much as legally possible with little concern for their sleep
schedule or fatigue,’’ while the U.S. students disagreed.
The U.S. students disagreed that ‘‘Management tries to get
around safety requirements whenever they get the chance.’’
The international students agreed with the item. The
perceptions of the international students were consistent
in their mean responses and reflected their poor outlook of
the prevailing safety culture in the flight program. This
could also imply a gap in alignment of safety promotion
coverage in their contract training. Safety culture assess-
ment is a dynamic process and requires establishing a
baseline for comparison. The safety culture will have to be
subjected to periodic and continuous assessment to be able
to build a confident database for comprehensive analysis.
Due to changes in procedures, operations, and even the
human components, the safety culture of an organiza-
tion will always evolve; safety staff and management will
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need to continuously review the effectiveness of the
safety management system (International Civil Aviation
Organization, 2009).
Finally, as part of the discussion, it should be noted that
the results and discussions of the study were limited to the
study sample, and care must be taken not to make
generalizations for all collegiate aviation programs since
safety culture is dynamic and could vary due to different
procedures; types of operations; and changes in manage-
ment, equipment, regulations, environment, and popula-
tion. However, the methodology and process could be
adapted to conduct safety culture assessments in other
collegiate aviation programs. The study assumed that all
international contract students had a proficient reading and
written comprehension level of the English language since
the survey was in English.
Recommendations
Safety assurance is a cyclic process even when the SMS
is fully matured, since there will always be the need for
periodic review and continuous improvement (Stolzer
et al., 2011). Safety culture studies should be continued
with other populations in the university’s flight program
such as ATC, maintenance, and UAS personnel. There
should also be an assessment of the perceptions of
university aviation management on the safety culture and
the results correlated with the perception of students to be
able to gauge the vertical extent of SMS saturation.
Another area that requires study is building a good fit
model of leading indicators like perception, attitude, and
behavior and using it as a predictor of lagging indicators
(safety outcome) like incidents, accidents, and violations
(IATA, n.d.). It is also recommended that further studies be
conducted in other collegiate aviation programs and the
results cross validated to build a useable database for
predictive safety studies. It is recommended that the FAA,
university aviation programs in the US, and industry
players provide funds for an intercollegiate safety culture
assessment research program to provide a baseline for the
implementation and continuous improvement of SMS in
universities.
The proposed research on safety culture assessment and
SMS will establish the necessary structures before the FAA
adopts a final rule on SMS for Part 141 training
organizations in the near future. Finally, more studies
should also be conducted on the effect of national culture
on the perceptions and behavior of foreign students in flight
training programs of U.S. universities which are imple-
menting SMS.
Conclusion
As part of the implementation of a Safety Management
System in a four-year Part 141 collegiate aviation program,
a safety culture assessment was conducted to determine the
perception of flight students and flight instructors on the
safety culture in the flight program. A safety culture
perception survey of a sample of flight students and
instructors was conducted using a modified survey called
CAPSCAS.
The study revealed that there were significant variances
in the perception of respondents on the safety culture by
year groups and the variance could potentially arise due to
different flight operational experience levels and years
spent in the flight program. There was an observed trend
that the more years and time spent in the aviation program,
the better the perception of the safety culture. This was
reflected in the responses among the year groups.
Significantly, the responses between the juniors and fresh-
men showed that, while the juniors had a very favorable
perception of the safety culture, the freshmen had less
favorable perception of the safety culture. There should be a
proactive review of the safety education program to better
suit the characteristics of these aviation student populations
as part of the SMS implementation. There should be more
attention and emphasis of the safety program for freshmen
and new personnel in the flight program.
There were also significant differences in the perceptions
of resident U.S. students and international contract students
on the program’s safety culture. The differences could be a
result of prior or dissimilar operational experiences,
language, and cultural environment. Generally, the U.S.
students had a more favorable perception of the safety
culture than the international contract students. The
international students had a perception that pilots who
called in sick or fatigued were scrutinized by flight
management personnel. The international students also
perceived that pilots had little or no authority to make
decisions that affect flight safety. The international students
also had a perception that pilots who are new or less senior
were unwilling to speak up regarding flight safety issues.
The international students also had a perception that
management did not show much concern for safety until
there was an accident or incident and that management tries
to get around safety requirements whenever they get the
chance. The international students also had a perception
that flight management personnel were unavailable when
pilots need help. Finally, the international students had a
perception that they were gambling with the safety of the
aircraft any time they went on a training activity.
The study shows that there is a need to modify and
restructure the safety promotion program for international
contract students which will take their specific national
culture and differences into consideration. Management
should ensure that a proactive effort is put in place to
bridge the national culture and safety expectations of the
international contract students with the university’s aviation
safety culture so that there will be less safety misalignment.
The safety alignment could be achieved through detailed
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and modified safety promotion curricula. Management
should ensure a more pronounced presence of safety
personnel/staff in contract training during the initial phase
of training at the university and periodic recurrent safety
promotional activities in order to close such safety gaps.
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